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  What role does noise play in equity markets?  Answering this question usually leads 
immediately to specifying a model of fundamentals and hence the pervasive joint hypothesis 
quagmire. We avoid this dilemma by measuring noise volatility directly by focusing on the 
behavior of country closed-end funds (CCEF’s) during foreign (i.e., non-U.S.) holidays – for 
example, the last days of Ramadan in Islamic countries.  These holiday periods are times when 
the flow of fundamental information relevant to foreign equity markets is substantially reduced   
and hence trading of CCEF’s in U.S. markets can be responding only weakly, if at all, to 
fundamental information.  We find that, controlling for the effects of industry and global shocks 
and of the overall U.S. market, there remains a substantial amount of noise in the equity returns 
of U.S. CCEF’s.  In the absence of noise, the noise ratio statistic would be near zero.  However, 
our results indicate statistically significant departures from zero, with values averaged over all 
U.S. CCEF’s ranging from 76-84%xx depending on assumptions about the leakage of 
information during holiday periods and kurtosis.  Noise is negatively related to institutional 
ownership of U.S. CCEF's and is much less important for U.K. CCEF's.  The lower levels of 
noise for matched U.K. and U.S. CCEF’s provide some initial evidence that the U.K. securities 
transaction tax is effective in reducing stock market noise.   
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 Noise vs. News In Equity Returns 
 
 
The quick and accurate reaction of security prices to information, as 
well as the non-reaction to non-information, are the two broad 
predictions of the efficient markets hypothesis. 
 
  Shleifer (2000, p. 5) 
 
Perhaps no single empirical issue is of more fundamental 
importance to both the fields of financial economics and 
macroeconomics than the question of whether or not stock prices 
are a well-informed and rational assessment of the value of future 
earnings available to stockholders. 
 
  Fischer and Merton (1984, p. 94) 
 
... it makes a great deal of difference to an investment market 
whether or not they [skilled long-term investors] predominate in 
their influence over the game-players. 
 
  Keynes (1936, p. 156) 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
What role does noise play in equity markets?  Textbooks provide elegant treatments that 
describe how rational investors use information to value equities and extract the subsequent 
implications for equity prices.  In the 1980’s, research began to suggest that there is substantial 
distance between this textbook view and the actual performance of equity markets.  For example, 
Shiller (1981) LeRoy and Porter (1981), and West (1988) show that equity prices are too volatile 
to be consistent with a net present value model based on fundamentals.  Cutler, Poterba, and 
Summers (1989) and Roll (1984, 1988) document the surprising inability of fundamental 
economic variables and important macroeconomic news known ex-post to explain equity returns.  
Many other studies – surveyed by LeRoy (1989), Shiller (1990), and Campbell, Lo, and 
MacKinlay (1997) and collected in Thaler (1993, 2005) – have highlighted several important 
problems with the view that equity prices conform to the two broad predictions of the efficient 
markets hypothesis mentioned by Shleifer in the above quotation.
1   
                                                 
1 See Malkiel (2003) and Shiller (2003) for an informative recent exchange about the status of the 
efficient markets hypothesis. 
   2
A quantitatively important role for noise -- market outcomes based on non-information 
(Black, 1986) or on "heuristics rather than Bayesian rationality" (Shleifer, 2000, p. 12) -- raises 
serious doubts as to whether equity markets are able to discharge their central function of 
allocating resources.
2  Noise disrupts equity markets in several ways.  Discount rates are raised 
by noise, thus lowering the level of the equilibrium capital stock and pressuring managers to 
adopt a short-term focus.
3  If noise is concentrated in certain industries (e.g., those where 
intangible capital and information technologies are important), resources directed through equity 
markets may be seriously misallocated.  Noise raises the cost of risk arbitrage and thus curbs the 
capacity of arbitrageurs to align market values with fundamental values.  If Keynes’ “game 
players” loom large, equity markets will be unable to allocate capital efficiently.
4  Moreover, 
noise creates deadweight losses, as real resources need to be expended to disentangle noise from 
fundamentals.  Noise-induced movements in equity prices may lead to the onset of bubbles, and 
bursting bubbles have substantial impacts on real spending.
5  This channel is amplified by the 
increasing proportion of assets held in equities and may well disrupt efforts by policymakers to 
stabilize the macroeconomy.     
How much of the volatility in equity returns can be attributed to noise relative to news?  
Addressing this question usually leads immediately to specifying a model of fundamentals and 
the pervasive joint hypothesis quagmire (Fama, 1970, 1991), which implies that, in any asset 
pricing model, the volatility attributable to noise can equally well be interpreted as the volatility 
                                                 
2 This list of problems stemming from noise is drawn from Shleifer and Summers (1990), Shiller (1990), 
and Shleifer (2000).  
3 De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990) present a model of noise trading risk, and Lee, 
Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) provide theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that noise qua investor 
sentiment is a systematic risk factor raising the required equity return.  This result is controversial; see the 
spirited exchange between Chen, Kan and Miller (1993) and Chopra, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1993).  
Even if noise is idiosyncratic, it can raise the required equity return through unbalanced portfolios (Levy, 
1978; Malkiel and Xu, 2002), incomplete information (Merton 1987a), or information risk (Easley, 
Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara, 2002).  Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) document that idiosyncratic risk predicts 
aggregate returns.  Their key result is confirmed by Ball, Cakici, Yan, and Zhang (2005) and Brown and 
Ferreira (2005), who argue that it is limited to small firms.   
 
4 Inefficiencies created by noise are the driving force in the "fundamental indexation" approach to 
investing advanced recently by Arnott, Hsu, and Moore (2005) and Siegel (2006).  
  
5 Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001) generate experimental evidence showing how noise impacts bubbles, and 
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), Chirinko and Schaller (2001, 2006), Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and 
Huberman (2005), and Polk and Sapienza (2003) document the effects of equity misvaluations on 
investment in property, plant, and equipment.      3
attributable to specification error.  This criticism necessarily confronts prior studies decomposing 
returns into fundamental and noise components.  These studies calculate noise by estimating the 
volatility attributable to fundamentals and then subtracting this estimate from overall volatility.  
Since noise volatility is a residual in this procedure, specification errors in the fundamental 
model are impounded in the subsequent estimate of noise.  Noise in the eyes of one researcher is 
specification error in the eyes of another.   
We avoid this quagmire by measuring noise volatility directly.  We are able to employ a 
direct estimation strategy by focusing on the behavior of country closed-end funds (CCEF’s) 
during holidays in foreign markets, where the latter is defined for purposes of this paper as the 
local equity market for countries other than the United States (or the United Kingdom in Section 
V).  Holiday periods – for example, the last days of Ramadan in Islamic countries – are times 
when the flow of fundamental information relevant to foreign equity markets is substantially 
reduced.  Consequently, trading of CCEF’s in U.S. markets can be responding only weakly, if at 
all, to fundamental information flowing from the foreign markets. CCEF return volatility during 
foreign holidays thus provides an accurate estimate of noise in the highly developed equity 
markets of the United States and the United Kingdom.  Our approach is most closely related to 
the pioneering study of French and Roll (1986), who use the closing of the New York Stock 
Exchange on Wednesday afternoons during the second half of 1968 to separate news from noise 
by “turning-off” the noise channel.  In contrast, the “natural experiment” afforded by foreign 
holidays turns-off (or tones-down) the news channel, thus allowing for a more direct estimate of 
equity market noise.    
This paper evaluates the importance of noise by estimating return variances from three 
nested models of increasing generality.  Section II models the return distribution for individual 
CCEF’s as a mixture of the underlying distributions for holidays and standard days, where the 
former depends on the noise variance while the latter depends on both noise and information 
variances.  The mixing variable is the exogenous occurrence of a foreign holiday.  The 
estimation problem is simplified by the non-stochastic nature of the mixing variable, and 
maximum likelihood and method-of-moments estimates are equivalent.  Based on 54 CCEF’s 
traded in the United States and controlling for the effects of industry shocks and the overall U.S. 
market, we compute a noise ratio statistic – NR, the noise variance divided by the sum of the 
noise and information variances – and find that, for CCEF returns adjusted for exchange rates   4
and the overall U.S. market, the mean of NR is 0.767xx.  A likelihood ratio test against the null 
hypothesis of a noise ratio of 0.10 is rejected at the 1% level for all 54xx funds in the sample.  
  An attractive feature of these baseline results is that they rely on an exogenous instrument 
(holidays) and few modeling assumptions, thus largely avoiding the joint hypothesis quagmire.  
The only two assumptions are the normality of returns and a substantial reduction in the flow of 
information on holidays.  Each of these assumptions is relaxed in Section III.  In order to account 
for the kurtosis that characterizes equity returns, we replace the normal distribution underlying 
the baseline results with a Scaled-t distribution.  The mean NR rises to 0.838xx and is 
statistically different from a noise ratio of 0.10 at the 1% level for all 54xx funds.  We then allow 
for the possibility that some information germane to CCEF returns is nonetheless transmitted 
during a holiday and develop a double mixture model, where the second mixture represents the 
possibility of information “arrival” or “leakage” during holidays.  Under this more general 
model, the mean NR falls to 0.759xx.  Formal hypothesis tests indicate that the NR is 
significantly far from 0.1; this null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level for 51xx of the 54 
CCEF's and at the 5% level for all but one of the funds.  Thus, our general conclusion about the 
importance of noise is robust to the leakage of some information during holidays.  
  Section IV briefly examines the role of institutional owners.  These financially 
sophisticated and patient investors are presumably less susceptible to the “sentiments” and 
“irrationalities” that drive noise trading.  We find some support for this hypothesis, as greater 
institutional ownership of CCEF's is associated with less noise.  This result is economically and 
statistically significant, and the elasticity of noise with respect to institutional ownership is about 
-0.15.xx  
  Section V repeats the analysis for 32 CCEF’s traded in the United Kingdom.  These 
results provide insights into the potency of a securities transaction tax that affects trades in the 
United Kingdom but not in the United States.  We find that the NR’s for U.K. CCEF’s are 
generally much lowerxx than those for U.S. CCEF’s.  This result continues to hold when we 
compare U.K. to U.S. CCEF's that invest in the same country.  These results for matched funds 
provide some initial evidence that the securities transactions tax lowers noise volatility.   
Section VI discusses several key papers that have assessed noise and its role in equity 
markets, and Section VII concludes.     5
II.  Baseline Evidence 
Our estimation strategy permits us to estimate noise directly.  We exploit the natural 
experiment produced by holidays that occur in a foreign country but that are not held at the same 
time in the United States.  During these holiday periods, the flow of fundamental information 
relevant to securities in the foreign market is substantially reduced.  Consequently, trading of 
CCEF’s in the U.S. markets can be responding only weakly, if at all, to fundamental information.  
CCEF return volatility (with suitable adjustments discussed later in this section) during foreign 
holidays thus provides an accurate estimate of noise in the U.S. equity market.    
We use a mixture model of returns and our identifying assumption to generate maximum 
likelihood estimates of the proportion of return variance due to noise.  We assume that, in 
general, the CCEF return on a standard day or holiday ( d,t R, dH , S = ) can be decomposed into 
two orthogonal components due to noise ( N
t R ) and information ( I
t R ), 
 
    NI
d,t t t RR R d H , S , t =+ = ∀ .        ( 1 )  
  
On standard days (non-holidays), CCEF returns are affected by both noise and information.  By 
contrast, the identifying assumption that the information flow is largely shut-off during holidays 
implies that  I
t R  does not affect holiday returns.  Thus, Rt is a mixture of distributions that apply 
during holidays and standard days with mixing weights determined by the occurrence of 
holidays, 
 
   
tt H , t t S , t
NN I
tt t t t
RR( 1 ) R t ,
R( 1 ) R R ) (
=ρ + −ρ ∀
=ρ + −ρ +
       ( 2 )  
 
where the mixing weight, ρt, is one for holidays and zero for standard days.  That the mixing 
weights are known and exogenous substantially simplifies the estimation problem.  In this case, 
the likelihood function is additively separable over holidays and standard days, and the 
conventional maximum likelihood estimator is identical to a method of moments estimator (see 
the Appendix, Subsection 3).  Volatility is measured in terms of variances, and the variance of   6
the return (V[Rt]) during holidays (VH) and standard days (VS) is related to the noise variance 
(V
N) and the information variance (V
I) as follows, 
 
    NH H
tH V[R ] V V t where ={t : t is a holiday} ≡= ∀ ∈ ℑ ℑ ,    (3a) 
    NI S S
tS V[R ] V V V t where ={t : t is a standard day} ≡= + ∀ ∈ ℑ ℑ .    (3b) 
 
Note that the subscripts on VH and VS denote sample moments, while the superscripts on 
V
N and V
I denote unknown parameters entering the likelihood function.  We assume that returns 
are distributed normal (an assumption that will be relaxed in Section III) and are mean zero (to 
be discussed below).   
To estimate the V
N and V
I parameters, we need data on foreign holidays, returns, and 
exchange rates.  Holidays are identified by zero daily positive trading volume of a broad foreign 
market index (e.g. the Nikkei 225) and trading in U.S. markets.  In several cases, we confirmed 
the accuracy of this procedure by cross-checking the holidays identified by the two criteria 
against the list of fixed and algorithmic holidays in Weaver (1995).  Thus, holidays are when 
business activity and hence the flow of relevant information are substantially reduced in the 
foreign country.   
Returns are drawn from the CRSP database on WRDS for the period beginning January 
1, 1980 (or the date that the CCEF was first listed) and ending December 31, 2004 (or the date 
that the CCEF was delisted).  CCEF's that cover more than one country (with one exception 
noted in Table 1) are excluded.  Table 1 lists the 54 CCEF funds for the U.S. used in this study, 
and the table notes provide additional details about data collection.   
  Daily exchange rate data are obtained from Datastream and augmented where missing 
with exchange rate data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.    
  The return series used to compute the sample moments (VH and VS) are adjusted for 
movements in exchange rates (by subtracting the log difference daily exchange rate from the 
CCEF return) and the U.S. market.  The sensitivity of CCEF returns to the U.S. market has been 
documented by Hardouvelis, La Porta, and Wizman (1994, Table 8.8A) and Bodurtha, Kim, and 
Lee (1995, Table 8).  To remove this effect, we estimate for each country a market model of the   7
exchange-rate-adjusted CCEF return against a constant and the return on the S&P 500.
6  The 
residuals from this regression define the mean zero return series, Rt, used to compute the sample 
moments (equation (3)), which are unaffected by movements in exchange rates and the U.S. 
market.    
hh I think that eqn 4 is the best way to make the adjustment.  In our first model, this is equivalent 
to VS (note I think we made a mistake by using the return variance, V[R]; standard days provide 
the best estimate of V
N+V
I).  When we get to the second model, using VS may not make sense, 
but I am not sure.  For the third model, perhaps even less so.  This adjustment will lower NR and, 
by construction, remove us from the corners where NR=1.  As I understand the calculation, when 
VH > VS, your program sets VI=0; when we add beta^2 * VM, the NR will be less than one.  
When implementing this correction, be careful that the units of the return variables are 
consistent. Lastly, note that all of the variables in 4 reflect exchange rate adjustments.    
  The impact of noise is assessed by a noise ratio statistic, NR, defined for each CCEF as 
follows, 
 
   N NI 2 M NR V / (V V V ) ≡+ + β ,          ( 4 )  
 
where β is the slope coefficient from the market model and  M V  is the variance of the market 
portfolio.  The latter term in the denominator captures variation due to the market and is added-
back so the denominator in equation (4) reflects both systematic and nonsystematic variation.
7  
Since noise is likely correlated with the market, the variation due to this correlation should also 
be added to the numerator of equation (4).  However, this variation can not be identified and, 
consequently, equation (4) serves as a lower bound for the true noise ratio.  hh 
  Maximum likelihood estimates of NR and the underlying estimates of V
N and V
I with 
their standard errors are presented in Table 2.  All estimates of V
N are statistically different than 
zeroxx.  In the absence of noise, the NR statistic would be zero apart from sampling error.  
                                                 
6 The constant terms (α’s) are uniformly negative with a mean value of -5 basis points, and the slope 
coefficients (β’s) range from -0.130 to 1.237 with a mean value of 0.667. The results for the market 
model and the noise ratios reported below are robust to defining the market return with or without 
dividends.   
 
7 The denominator thus equals the variation of returns on standard days (equation (3b)) adjusted for 
exchange rate movements.    8
However, the NR’s in column (2) are in most cases very far from zero with a mean value of 
0.767xx.  These results are not driven by outliers and are robust to trimming 1% of the upper and 
lower tails (2% in total) of the holiday return distribution and then a similar trimming of the 
standard day distribution.  Table 2 documents that there is a substantial amount of noise in the 
equity returns of CCEF’s traded in the United States.   
  Tenxx of the estimated NR’s are unity.  This maximum value reflects a corner solution in 
which V
I is on the boundary of zero and occurs for those CCEF’s whose holiday variance 
exceeds the standard day variance.  Since our model assigns all of the holiday variance to noise 
and allows noise to also affect the standard day variance, no role remains for information.  These 
extreme situations may well reflect sampling error and, interestingly, do not occur for the UK 
funds considered in Section V.  Most importantly, these tests are not problematic for tests of 
noise because the holiday variance exceeding the standard day variance clearly rejects the notion 
that noise is unimportant.  
  We formally evaluate the null hypothesis that the NR is 0.10 (thus allowing some noise to 
affect the estimates) against the maximum likelihood values in Table 2.
8  Details of this 
likelihood ratio test are presented in Section 4 of the Appendix.  Hypothesis tests indicate that 
the NR's are very far from 0.10; the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level for all 54xx funds.   
  Complementary evidence is provided by examining trading volume on holiday and 
standard days.  In this case, the noise ratio statistic, NR
VOL, is defined in terms of the first 
moment of trading volume, 
 
   VOL N N I NR VOL / (VOL VOL ) ≡+ ,         ( 5 )  
 
where VOL
N is trading volume due to noise estimated by mean trading volume on holidays and 
VOL
I is trading volume due to information estimated by mean trading volume on standard days 
less VOL




I, respectively).  As with 
the return-based NR's, NR
VOL is far from zero.  The mean value of the NR
VOL 's displayed in 
column (7) is 0.481.   
  There are several attractive features of our estimation strategy.  The holiday instrument is 
clearly exogenous and independent of noise in U.S. equity markets, and the factors that 
                                                 
8 Under certain distribution assumptions, NR is distributed Cauchy, which has neither a mean nor 
variance, and therefore NR can not be evaluated with a Wald test.    9
contribute to closed-end fund discounts do not vary at a daily frequency.   Distortions due to 
trading location documented by Froot and Dabora (1999) and Hau (2001) do not impact our 
estimates, which are computed only for the U.S. market on holidays and standard days.  The 
results in Table 2 rely on few modeling assumptions and thus largely avoid the joint hypothesis 
quagmire.  The only two assumptions are the normality of returns -- to be relaxed in Section 
III.A -- and the substantial reduction in the flow of information on holidays.    
  The estimation strategy adopted in this paper rests on the latter identifying assumption.  
Even if a foreign country is closed for business, the fortunes of its companies might be buffeted 
by industry or global shocks emanating from outside the country.  Industry shocks will not 
compromise our results because they will be dissipated over the portfolio of stocks constituting 
the CCEF's.  Global shocks will in large part be accounted for by the market model, as the U.S. 
return will capture both the effects of the U.S. market and that part of the global shock correlated 
with the U.S. market.  The residual global shock is accounted for in two ways.  First, insofar as 
global shocks are large and infrequent, their impact is eliminated by trimming the tails of the 
distributions.  Second, the impact of whatever fundamental global (or industry) information 
remains will be captured by the double mixture model of returns that allows for information 
leakage and that will be discussed in Section III.B.     10
III.  Refinements 
A.  Kurtosis 
  The variance estimates in Table 2 are based on the assumption that the returns are 
distributed normal.  Given the well documented kurtosis in equity returns (e.g., Campbell, Lo, 
and MacKinlay, 1997, Table 1.1), variance estimates in the numerator and denominator of NR 
may be biased.  A parsimonious way for addressing this problem is to assume that CCEF returns 
are distributed Scaled-t.
9  Under this more general assumption, the log likelihood depends on a 
variance parameter and a “degrees-of-freedom” parameter, k > 2.  For values of k > 30, the 
Scaled-t distribution converges to the normal distribution used in the previous section.  Since the 
Scaled-t distribution introduces higher order even moments, multiple solutions exist for V
N and 
V
I estimated by the method of moments.
10  To avoid this multiplicity problem, we evaluate the 
log likelihood function with a grid search over the parameter vector Ψ = {V
N, V
I, k}.  A grid 
search also allows us to avoid using incorrect estimates defined by a local maximum.
11  The 
parameter space is determined by the admissible values in equation (3):  V
N = {(1/m)VH, 
(2/m)VH,…, VH}, V
I = {(1/m)VS, (2/m)VS,…, VS}, k = {3, 4,…, 30}, where the parameter 
determining the size of the increments is m = 400.
12   
                                                 
9 Focusing on unconditional volatility with the Scaled-t distribution requires fewer modeling choices than 
GARCH modeling of conditional volatility.  Praetz (1972) links a fluctuating return variance to the 
Scaled-t distribution.  The density function for the Scaled-t distribution for standard days is as follows,  
 





(k 1)/2 2N I
t
f ( R ; VV , k ) ( k 1 ) / 2 /k / 2 ( k 2 ) ( VV )
1 (R /((k 2)(V V )))
−+
⎧⎫ ⎛⎞ ⎪⎪ += Γ + Γ π − + ⎜⎟ ⎨⎬ ⎜⎟ ⎪⎪ ⎝⎠ ⎩⎭
⎧⎫ ⎪⎪ ⎡⎤ +− + ⎨⎬ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
 
 
where k is the degrees of freedom parameter and Γ(.) is the gamma function.  This density characterizes 
holiday returns when V
I = 0.   
 
10 We thank Nicholas Kiefer for this observation that led us to maximum likelihood estimation.   
 
11 The possibility of settling at a local maximum or encountering other estimation problems with an ill-
behaved likelihood function (Hamilton, 1994, p. 689) will be exacerbated in the double mixture model 
discussed in Section III.B. 
 
12 When we use a finer partition and set m = 1000 for several CCEF's, the point estimates are nearly 
identical in the sense that the estimate based on the finer partition is always within the "band" created by 
the coarser partition with m = 400.  For example, if V
N* is the optimal value of V
N for the coarser partition 
and defines a band, {((x*-1)/400) VH, (x*/400) VH} for x* ={1, 400}, and if V
N** is the optimal value of 
V
N for the finer partition, then ((x*-1)/400) VH   <  V
**  <  (x*/400) VH.   11
  Table 3 contains maximum likelihood estimates with the Scaled-t distribution.  Estimates 
of k range from 3 to 6 with a mode of 4xx.  These estimates are very far from the value of k = 30 
that corresponds to a normality assumption and suggest the importance of accounting for fat-tails 
in the return distribution.
13  Relative to assuming normality in Table 2, we find that the V
N’s tend 
to rise modestly and the V
I’s decline more sharplyxx.  The percentage changes in the means of 
V
N and V
I are +5.5%xx and -22.7%xx, respectively (excluding the large observation for the 
Austria Fundxx).  The mean value of NR rises 9.3%xx from 0.767xx in Table 2 to 0.838xx in 
Table 3.  Our conclusion that CCEF returns are largely influenced by noise is insensitive to 
kurtosis. 
 
B.  A Double Mixture Model Of Returns  
  The above estimates have been based on the assumption that, on foreign holidays, the 
flow of information relevant for pricing CCEF’s is totally eliminated.  Nonetheless, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that -- despite our adjustments for industry and global shocks, exchange 
rates, and the U.S. overall market -- some information germane to CCEF returns is transmitted 
during a holiday.  This subsection generalizes the previous models by allowing for the possibility 
of information “arrival” or “leakage” during holidays. 
CCEF returns are modeled as a double mixture.
14  We assume that the probability of 
information “arrival” or “leakage” during holidays is non-negative and represented by a 
parameter, 0 < λ < 0.5, the probability of information arrival.  The importance of information 
(and thus the volatility due to information) for holiday returns is influenced by the value of λ.  In 
this case, the holiday return in equation (1) is replaced by the following mixture of noise and 
information returns,   
 
   
NI H H
H,t t t t
NN I
tt tt t
R R R t where ={t : t is a holiday},
(1 )R (R R ),
=+ δ ∀ ∈ ℑ ℑ
=− δ + δ +
  (6) 
 
                                                 
13 Similar results for k are obtained by Aparicio and Estrada (2001) for daily aggregate return indices  
of 13 European equity markets.   
 
14 See Hamilton (1994, Section 22.3) and McLachlan and Peel (2000, Chapter 1) for overviews of mixture 
models.  Roll (1988, Section IV.A) uses a formulation similar to equation (6).    12
where the stochastic mixing weight, δt, equals 1 if information arrives on a given day, is 0 
otherwise, and is distributed Bernoulli with mean λ.  The second line in equation (6) highlights 
how δt is a mixing weight for noise and noise plus information.  Allowing for information 
leakage during holidays does not affect the equation for standard days (equation (1) with d=S).  
The double mixture model combines the returns from holidays and standard days and, for each of 
these types of days, combines the returns from noise and news,  
    
   
tt H , t t S , t
NN I N I
tt t tt t t tt t
RR( 1 ) R t ,
R ((1 )R (R R )) (1 )(R R ).
=ρ + −ρ ∀
=ρ −δ + δ + + −ρ +
     ( 7 )  
 
  In general, analyzing this double mixture model would be very difficult.  However, in our 
case, one of the mixing variables (ρt) is non-stochastic, and the estimation problem becomes 
considerably more tractable.  The log likelihood function is evaluated with a grid search over the 
parameter vector Ψ = {V
N, V
I, k, λ} for the same parameter space as used for the Scaled-t model 
for the first three parameters.  In addition, we allow λ = {0.1, 0.2,…, 0.5}, reflecting the 
possibility that there is some  information flow during holidays.  
  Imposing the Scaled-t distributions for V
N and V
I is important for proper inferences to be 
drawn from the double mixture model.  A possible difficulty with using equations (6) or (7) to 
quantify noise is that the estimated λ may be influenced by return kurtosis.  If the underlying 
returns were assumed normal, a high value of λ could be due to information flow during holidays 
or to the kurtotic distribution of returns captured by a mixture of two normals (Press, 1967; 
McLachlan and Peel, 2000, Section 1.5).  By assuming that V
N and V
I are distributed Scaled-t, 
we allow λ greater scope for capturing information flows.  
    Parameter estimates for the double mixture model presented in Table 4 confirm the 
importance of noise.  All but three of the NR’s are above 0.40xx.  As expected, the role of noise 
is diminished in this model that allows some of the holiday return volatility to be accounted for 
by information.  The mean NR of 0.759xx is lower than the mean NR of 0.838xx (Table 3) for 
the Scaled-t model without leakage.  
We formally evaluate the null hypothesis that the NR is 0.10 (thus allowing some noise to 
affect the estimates) against the maximum likelihood values in Table 4.  As indicated by the p-
values in column 7, this null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level for 51xx of the 54 CCEF's and   13
at the 5% level for all but onexx fund.  Noise continues to be an important component of return 
volatility even when there is information leakage during holidays.     14
IV.  Institutional Ownership 
The results in Table 4 provide some evidence that the source of noise is not related to 
characteristics of the non-U.S. markets in which the CCEF's underlying assets are located.  
Several countries have more than one CCEF.  For Brazil, France, and Thailand, the NR's within 
a country are fairly close togetherxx.  More dispersion exists for other countries.  For example, 
The Emerging Mexico Fund and the Mexico Equity and Income CCEF's have NR’s of 0.721xx 
and 0.759xx, respectively; these NR’s are much higher than the value of 0.399xx for the Mexico 
Fund.  Given this variety, country characteristics are unlikely to explain the variation in the 
NR’s.    
  Noise thus appears to be driven by the trading environment in U.S. equity markets or the 
nature of CCEF investors.  The role of the trading environment will be explored in Section V by 
drawing comparisons between U.S. and U.K. CCEF’s.  Here we investigate the role of 
institutional ownership, which is a salient investor characteristic that presumably identifies 
financially sophisticated and patient owners less susceptible to the “sentiments” that drive noise 
trading.  We would thus expect the NR’s for country c to be negatively related to the percentage 
of equity of a CCEF for country c held by institutions, INSTc.   
  This hypothesis is evaluated in terms of a linear regression of NRc on INSTc, and the 
results are presented in Table 5.  (Since NRc appears as the dependent variable, this regression is 
immune to a generated regressor problem.)  Three NRc's are used and are taken from column 2 of 
Tables 2, 3, and 4.  INSTc is taken from column 9 of Table 1 (see the Notes to Table 5 for the 
precise definition of institutional ownership and other details).  As shown in panel A, noise is 
negatively associatedxx with institutional ownership for each estimate of noise.  This relation is 
statistically different from zero at conventional levels of significance for the two NRc's based on 
the Scaled-t distribution.  The elasticity of noise with respect to institutional ownership is about -
0.15xx (column 2).   This result is robust in two dimensions. First, the linear regression model is 
expanded to included quadratic and cubic terms.  The elasticities (not reported) range between  
-0.10xx and -0.20xx, though they tend to be estimated less precisely than those in Table 5.  
Second, panel B repeats this exercise but with a sample of CCEF's that are trimmed to reduce the 
potential effects of outliers, and resultsxx similar to those for the complete sample are obtained.  
The associations reported in Table 5 surely do not necessarily imply a causal role for institutional 
ownership.  A plausible alternative interpretation is that institutions prefer less volatile funds and   15
that stock return volatility is positively correlated with the noise volatility estimated here.
15  This 
important caveat notwithstanding, the results in Table 5 provide some suggestive evidence of an 
interesting relation between noise and the "smart money." 
                                                 
15 There is a bit of indirect evidence against the first element of the alternative interpretation.  Gompers 
and Metrick (2001, Table IV) report that the relation between institutional ownership and stock return 
volatility is negative and statistically significant (at the 5% level) in only 13% of the cross-section 
regressions.  Contrary to the alternative interpretation, 46% of their cross-section regressions yield a 
statistically significant positive relation between institutional ownership and stock return volatility.   
   16
V.  The United Kingdom And The Securities Transaction Tax 
  Further insights about the importance of noise and its sensitivity to the trading 
environment can be obtained by repeating the above exercise on CCEF’s traded in the United 
Kingdom (known there as investment trusts).  Meaningful comparisons can be drawn because 
these two equity markets are widely viewed as the most developed in the world.  Moreover, only 
the United Kingdom imposes a securities transaction tax. 
  Estimated NR’s are presented in summary fashion in Table 6 for 32 U.K. CCEF's.  hh is 
the info in parentheses correct? hh (Returns and exchange rate data are taken from Datastream 
for the period January 1, 1980 to December 31, 2004; the percentage change in the FTSE 100 is 
used for the market return.)  The NR’s in columns (2) and (3) are based on the Normal and 
Scaled-t distributions, respectively, and on the assumption of no leakage of information during 
holidays.  This latter assumption is relaxed in column (4).  Two interesting results emerge.  First, 
relative to the U.S. NR’s, the average estimates for the United Kingdom are much lower:  
0.410xx vs. 0.767xx for the Normal distribution without leakage, 0.644xx vs. 0.838xx for the 
Scaled-t distribution without leakage, and 0.363xx vs. 0.759xx for the Scaled-t distribution with 
leakage.  Second, the numerous Japanese CCEF’s provide further evidence that noise is 
unrelated to the characteristics of the non-U.K. market in which the underlying assets for the 
CCEF are located.  For the 14 Japanese funds traded in the U.K., the NR’s in column 4 range 
widely -- the standard deviation is 0.225xx (relative to a mean of 0.336xx) and the high and low 
values are 0.721xx and 0.109xx.      
  Given the depth and sophistication of the U.S. and U.K. equity markets, the first result 
concerning relatively less U.K. volatility seems puzzling.  However, an important difference 
between these equity markets is that the United Kingdom has assessed a Stamp Duty Reserve 
Tax since 1891.  During our sample period, this tax was assessed at the rate of 2.0% from 1980 
to 1983, 1.0% from 1984 to 1985, and 0.5% from 1986 to 2004 on the value of paperless 
transactions.
16  If this transactions tax is effective in reducing noise trading, we would expect 
that, for those countries in which both U.K. and U.S. CCEF’s invest, the NR’s for the United 
Kingdom will be less than those for the United States.  There are 11 countries for which CCEF’s 
                                                 
16 See Institute for Fiscal Studies (2007); all dates are for the beginning of the fiscal year.  There is a 
closely related Stamp Duty for transactions using paper forms, though these are relatively rare.  The U.K. 
transaction tax is the highest in the world.  See Campbell and Froot (1995, Section 2.2) and Summers and 
Summers (1989, Section 2) for detailed discussions of transaction taxes in the United Kingdom and other 
industrialized countries.   
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exist in both the United Kingdom and the United States.  The NR’s for these matched CCEF’s 
are presented in Table 7, as well as the ratio of the U.K. to the U.S. noise ratios (RNR).  About 
one-half of the RNR's are below 0.700xx.  The results in Table 7 do not merely reflect lower 
relative volatility for U.K. equities (as the U.K. equity market is 19% more volatile than the U.S. 
market)
17 nor relatively higher capital gains taxes in the United Kingdom that would dampen 
noise trading.
18 Hh fn. 18 is new hh For the most general model based on a Scaled-t distribution 
and the possibility of information leakage during holidays, the RNR’s listed between columns (6) 
and (7) have a mean value of 0.634xx. 
The evidence presented in Table 7 should only be viewed as preliminary, as the roles of 
commissions and other frictions impeding noise traders need to be considered in a fuller 
empirical assessment of the securities transaction tax.  Nonetheless, the results are of some 
interest, especially since they focus on the policy-relevant noise volatility.  They offer some 
support for the “cautious case” for a securities transactions tax proposed by Summers and 
Summers (1989), and they verify a claim made long ago by Keynes (1936, pp. 159-160),  
 
That the sins [speculation] of the London Stock Exchange are less than those 
of Wall Street may be due, not so much to differences in national character, 
as to the fact that to the average Englishman Throgmorton Street is, 
compared with Wall Street to the average American, inaccessible and very 
expensive.  The jobber’s “turn”, the high brokerage charges and the heavy 
transfer tax payable to the Exchequer, which attend dealings on the London 
Stock Exchange, sufficiently diminish the liquidity of the market (although 
the practice of fortnightly accounts operates the other way) to rule out a large 
proportion of the transactions characteristic of Wall Street.  The introduction 
of a substantial Government transfer tax on all transactions might prove the 
most serviceable reform available, with a view to mitigating the 
predominance of speculation over enterprise in the United States. 
 
                                                 
17 The aggregate volatilities are computed as the coefficients of variation in the percentage change in the 
price indices of the S&P500 and FTSE100.  These statistics are merely suggestive, as there can be a great 
deal of distance between the volatility for the overall equity market and the volatility due to noise.    
 
18 During the period 1980 to 2004, the marginal tax rate on short-term capital gains in the United 
Kingdom (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2007; all dates are for the beginning of the fiscal year) varied 
between 30% (1980 to 1987) and 40% (1988 to 2004).  The comparable U.S. rate (Office of Tax Policy 
Research, 2007) exceeded the U.K. rate from 1980 to 1987, was slightly below it in 1988, lower than it 
from 1989 to 1992, and then virtually equal to it from 1993 to 2004.   Moreover, for a large class of U.K. 
investors, the marginal tax rate is zero because of an annual exemption of net capital gain income.  The 
exemption was £3,000 in 1980 and has increased steadily to £8,200 in 2004.     18
The results are also supportive of very recent policy initiative by the Chinese finance ministry to 
curb stock market volatility and a putative bubble by raising the securities transaction tax from 
0.1% to 0.3% (Bradsher, 2007). 
Hh this sentence is new hh     19
VI.  Discussion 
  Several papers that have assessed noise and its role in equity markets or that have studied 
CCEF’s are reviewed in this section (though the discussion is not exhaustive).  Our approach is 
related to the well-known study of French and Roll (1986) that exploits a very interesting natural 
experiment.
19  They compare equity volatilities between trading and non-trading days and find 
that the hourly return variance during trading days is 71.8 times greater than over weekends 
(Friday close to Monday close; p. 223).  As the authors note, this huge number can be traced to 
the absence of noise traders or a reduced flow of fundamental information on non-trading days.  
They use the closure of the New York Stock Exchange on Wednesdays during the second half of 
1968 to differentiate between the noise and information explanations.  The two-day return 
volatility from Tuesdays to Thursdays during the Wednesday exchange holidays is 1.15 times 
greater than the one-day volatility (the latter computed from January 1963 to December 1982).  
If return volatilities were unaffected by the trading process, this ratio should be 2.00.  Clearly, 
trading raises volatility.  While extremely informative, this particular natural experiment is 
unable to differentiate between two competing and very different hypotheses -- whether the 
trading process reveals information (which French and Roll favor based on autocorrelation tests) 
or generates noise.
20  By contrast, our focus on non-U.S. holidays generates a direct estimate of 
the impact of noise.  Information may not be completely turned-off during non-U.S. holidays, 
and the double mixture model allows for this information leakage.  
Hh entire paragraph is new  
  An alternative means for controlling for fundamentals focuses on the return difference 
between “Siamese twin” companies, defined as companies whose equity has different trading 
                                                 
19 Our approach is also related to Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2000, 2003) and Hirshleifer and Shumway 
(2003), who use the natural experiments of the exogenous shifts to and from daylight saving time and in 
the amount of daylight and sunshine to identify behavior in equity markets that deviates from the efficient 
markets benchmark.   
 
20 French and Roll discriminate between the private information and noise hypotheses by examining 
weekly return volatility for weeks with and without an exchange holiday.  Consistent with the noise 
hypothesis, weekly return volatility is lower during weeks with exchange holidays, but this difference is 
not statistically significant.  Using the natural experiment of occasional Saturday trading on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, Barclay, Litzenberger, and Warner (1990) find that, for weeks with Saturday trading, the 
weekly return volatility is unchanged relative to weeks without Saturday trading; this result is consistent 
with the private information hypothesis.  By contrast, the weekly volume for weeks with Saturday trading 
is higher, which can be interpreted as consistent with the noise hypothesis (per French and Roll) or the 
private information hypothesis (as argued by Barclay, Litzenberger, and Warner).   
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and ownership habitats but whose charters specify the division of a common pool of cash flow.  
Exploiting the key identifying assumption that fundamental information is the same for twin 
equities, Scruggs (2007) draws-out the implications for noise.
21  His estimates imply relatively 
low NR’s, ranging from 11% to 19% for daily returns.
22  While Siamese twins provide a very 
clever way to control for fundamentals, location frictions -- such as securities taxes -- that differ 
between exchanges might cause returns to deviate from fundamentals independent of noise.
23  
This problem can be avoided by focusing on ADR’s of the twins traded in New York.  But a 
second problem arises in estimating noise from the difference in twin returns, as we must assume 
that the individual noise components for the twins are uncorrelated (see fn. 22).  Given that noise 
trading is likely to be positively correlated among twin stocks, estimates of NR will be 
downward biased. hh 
  In an interesting paper, Pontiff (1997) documents that the volatility of closed-end fund 
prices is excessive, being 64% greater than the volatility of fundamentals as represented by 
NAV's.  While there is much useful information in these results, several issues arise linking these 
volatilities to noise.  First, Abraham, Elan, and Marcus (1993) show that the premium in closed-
end equity and bond funds have very similar correlations with the market.  This coincidence of 
results may reflect time varying risk premium affecting both equity and bond markets, and it 
raises questions about interpreting variations in the premium on closed-end equity funds as 
                                                 
21 Froot and Dabora (1999) also examine twin equities but focus on the relations between trading location 
and equity returns.   
 
22 The NR statistic is computed from Scrugg’s estimates as follows.  Writing the equity returns for each 
twin as  NI
tt t RR R =+  (as in our equation (1) and a simplified version of Scruggs’ equation (1)) and 
taking the difference of the twin returns (θ), we obtain the following relation,  '"
tt RR θ ≡− 
N' I' N" I" N' N"
tt tt tt RR RR RR =+ − −=−, where the  I
t R  variables are eliminated by the key identifying 
assumption that fundamental information is the same for each twin equity ( I' I"
tt RR = ).  The numerator of 
the NR statistic (equation (4)) requires a measure of noise, which we define as an average of the noise 
variances for each twin.  Applying the variance operator to the above expression for θ, we obtain the 
following relation,  N' N" N' N"
tt t t (V[R ] V[R ])/2 (V[ ] 2*C[R ,R ])/2 += θ + , where C[.]  is the covariance 
operator and  N' N"
tt C[R ,R ] is unobservable.  The denominator of the NR statistic is defined as an average 
of the return variance for each twin,  '"
tt (V[R ] V[R ])/2 + .  Values for  '
t V[R ],  "
t V[R ], and θ are taken 
from Scruggs, 2007, Table 1).   
  
23 This concern is noted by Scruggs (2007, pp. 85-86).  Other tests reported in his paper indicate that noise 
volatility, estimated by conditional volatilities, is large.     21
reflecting noise.  Second, if noise affects equity prices in U.S. markets, then presumably noise 
affects the non-U.S. market as well.  Thus, NAV is a noisy measure of fundamental value.  
Third, interactions between fundamentals and noise compromise the use of premia to estimate 
noise.  Consider the following accounting identity relating the price of the CCEF (P) to 
fundamental value (F, measured by the NAV) and the premium, Φ[N, F], where the latter 
depends on both noise (N) and fundamentals and time subscripts have been omitted for 
notational convenience, 
 
  P[ N , F ] F =Φ .            ( 8 )  
 
Taking logs, totally differentiating with respect to P, N, and F, defining returns (RX) as the 
percentage change in X = {P, F,  [N,F] Φ }, computing variances, and rearranging terms, we 





















 .  (9) 
 
where C[.] is the covariance operator and ΦN and ΦF refer to partial derivatives of the premium 
with respect to N and F, respectively.  The left-side of equation (9) equals the 64% figure 
reported by Pontiff.  Equation (9) is a useful estimate of the variance due to noise, defined by 
N V[R ] Φ , provided the remaining four terms in the large parentheses  are zero.  The results of 
Campbell and Kyle (1993) and Klibanoff, Lamont, and Wizman (1998) suggest that 
fundamentals affect the premium, and hence 
F RΦ is time-varying.  Even if 
F RΦ  is constant and 
hence the three terms in the second line in the large parentheses equal zero, the
N F C[R ,R ] Φ  
term disrupts accurately measuring noise by the variances in market prices and NAV’s.  The 
approach presented in the present study avoids these issues in quantifying noise.   
  Several studies have documented excess volatility in equities relative to various measures 
of fundamentals.  Roll (1984, 1988) finds that the volatilities of orange juice futures and monthly 
equity returns, respectively, are poorly explained by ex-post fundamentals.  In the case of equity   22
returns, about 20% of the variation in daily returns and about 35% of the variation in monthly 
returns are explained by fundamentals.  Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1989, Table 1) report that 
contemporaneous macro variables capturing important news items explain about 20% of the 
variation in monthly aggregate returns (for the period 1926-1985) and about 6% of the variation 
in annual aggregate returns (1871-1986).  Equity prices are much more volatile than the present 
value of the dividend stream computed with a constant discount rate (LeRoy and Porter (1981), 
Shiller (1981), and West (1988)), and equity returns are much more volatile than consumption 
growth (Campbell, 2003).  These excess volatility studies suggest a natural and quantitatively 
important role for noise in filling the wide gap between equity prices (or returns) and 
fundamentals.    23
VII.  Conclusions 
  This paper uses the natural experiment provided by foreign holidays to quantify the 
impact of noise on equity returns in highly developed equity markets.   Our baseline results 
highlight that there is a great deal of noise in the returns of CCEF’s in the United States.  These 
results prove robust to kurtosis and the possibility of information leakage during holidays.  Noise 
is negatively related to institutional ownership of U.S. CCEF's and is much less important for 
U.K. CCEF's.  The lower levels of noise for matched U.K. and U.S. CCEF’s suggests that the 
securities tax imposed in the United Kingdom may be effective in reducing equity market noise.   
  Noise disrupts financial markets, raises the cost of capital, impedes arbitrageurs, 
complicates stabilization policies, and is central to the issue of stock market efficiency.  Merton 
(1987b, p. 93) states the critical test:   
 
“The theory [the rational market hypothesis] is not, however, a 
tautology. It is not consistent with models or empirical facts that 
imply that either stock prices depend in an important way on 
factors other than the fundamentals underlying future cash flows 
and discount rates, …    
 
 
A quantitatively important role for noise documented in this study thus challenges the efficient 
market model and points toward the behavioral finance alternative as a framework model for 
understanding equity markets.   
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Appendix:  The Double Mixture Model Of Returns:   
                    Derivation Of The Likelihood Function And Likelihood Ratio Test 
This appendix derives the likelihood function and likelihood ratio test statistic for the 
double mixture model of returns.  This is the most general of the three models estimated in this 
paper, and the other two models are derived as special cases under suitable parametric 
restrictions.  We begin with the model of returns.   
 
1.  Returns 
  Returns are defined as a mixture of holiday and standard day returns, 
   
   tt H , t t S , t RR( 1 ) R t =ρ + −ρ ∀ ,         ( A 1 )  
 
where  tH , t S , t R , R , and R  are returns for the full sample, holidays, and standard days (non-
holidays), respectively, and  t ρ  is the mixing variable equal to one for holidays and zero for 
standard days.      
  Holiday returns are defined as a mixture of noise ( N
t R ) and information ( I
t R ) returns,   
 
   NI H H
H,t t t t R R R     t  where  {t :t holiday} =+ δ ∀ ∈ ℑ ℑ == ,    (A2a) 
 
       NN
t R ~ Scaled t(0,V ,k) − ,              ( A 2 b )  
     II
t R~ S c a l e d t ( 0 , V , k ) − ,              ( A 2 c )  
     t ~B e ( ) δλ ,                ( A 2 d )  
 
where δt equals 1 if information arrives at date t and 0 otherwise.  This mixing variable is 
distributed Bernoulli with mean λ.  The returns due to noise and information are distributed 
Scaled-t with zero location parameter, a dispersion parameter equal to V
N or V
I, and k degrees of 
freedom.  Assuming independence between noise returns, information returns, and the arrival of 
information, we can express the holiday return variance (VH) as follows, 
   30
   N I
H VV V =+ λ .            ( A 3 )  
 
  Returns on standard days are defined as the sum of both noise and information, 
 
   NI S S
S,t t t R R R     t  where  {t :t standard} =+ ∀ ∈ ℑ ℑ == .   (A4) 
 
The standard day variance (VS) can be expressed as follows, 
 
   N I
S VV V =+ .            ( A 5 )  
 
2.  Densities And The Log Likelihood 
  In our double mixture model, CCEF returns are characterized by a parameter vector, Ψ, 
containing four unknowns, 
 
   NI {V ,V ,k, } Ψ= λ .            ( A 6 )  
 
Based on equation (A1), the density of CCEF returns ( t f(R ; ) Ψ ) is a mixture of the densities of 
holiday and standard day returns, 
 
   tt H , t t S , t f(R ; ) f(R ; ) (1 )f(R ; ) t Ψ= ρ Ψ+ − ρ Ψ ∀.      ( A 7 )  
 
  Holiday returns are also defined as a mixture of returns.  With the definition of returns 
given in equation (A2), the joint density for returns and information leakage is given by the sum 
of the conditional densities, 
 
H
H,t t t t t t t f(R ; ) f(R | 0)h( 0) f(R | 1 )h( 1 ) t Ψ= δ= δ= + δ= δ= ∀∈ ℑ,    (A8) 
 
where h(δt) is the unconditional density for δt.  Given the distribution assumptions in equations 
(A2), equation (A7) becomes,   31
 
   N IN H
H,t t t f(R ; ) f(R ;V ,V ,k) (1 )f(R ;V ,k) t Ψ= λ + − λ ∀∈ ℑ.    (A9) 
 
  On standard days, returns are influenced by both noise and information, 
 
   NI S
S,t t f(R ; ) f(R ;V ,V ,k) t Ψ= ∀∈ ℑ.        ( A 1 0 )  
 








f(R ; ) [ f(R ;V ,V ,k) ( 1 )f(R ;V ,k)] t.
(1 )f(R ;V ,V ,k)
Ψ= ρλ + − λ ∀
+− ρ
     ( A 1 1 )  
 












f(R ;V ,V ,k) 1 t, (A12)
(k 2) V (k 2) V
V{ V , V V } ,
− +




where k is the degrees of freedom parameter and Γ(.) is the gamma function.  
  The four unknown parameters in Ψ are estimated using maximum likelihood.  The log 






lnL( ) lnf(R ; )
=
Ψ= Ψ ∑ ,           ( A 1 3 )  
   
where f(Rt; Ψ) is defined in equation (A11).  Since the holiday mixing variable is non-stochastic, 











lnL( ) ln[ f(R ;V ,V ,k) (1 )f(R ;V ,k)]
(1 )lnf(R ;V ,V ,k),
=
=




               (A14) 
 
With the densities given in equation (A11), the log likelihood function can be maximized with 
respect to the elements in Ψ (equation (A6)). 
 
3. The Empirical Results 
  All of the empirical results in this paper are based on the log likelihood in equation 
(A14).  The most general results, presented in Table 4 and column (4) of Table 6, are based on 
estimates of all four parameters in Ψ.  The results in Table 3 and column 3 of Table 6 are based 
on the assumption that there is no leakage of information during holidays; hence, Ψ = (V
N, V
I, k, 
λ=0).  In this case, for a given k, the first summation in equation (A14) depends only on V
N.  
Given this estimate of V
N, the second summation determines V
I.  The results in Table 2 and 
column (2) of Table 6 are based on the assumption that returns are distributed normal.  The 
Scaled-t distribution converges to the normal and provides a good approximation to the normal 
when k > 30; hence, Ψ = (V
N, V
I, k=30, λ=0) .  In this case, the first summation in equation 
(A14) depends only on V
N, the second summation depends only on (V
N + V
I), and we obtain the 
well known equality between maximum likelihood and method of moments estimates of the 
variances when returns are normal (cf. equations (3) in the text).  
 
4.  Likelihood Ratio Test 
  The noise ratio statistic, NR = V
N / (V
N+V
I), is a ratio of two random variables.  Under 
certain conditions, this ratio is distributed Cauchy, which has neither a mean nor variance, and 
therefore can not be evaluated directly for hypothesis testing.  However, since the parameters are 
estimated by maximum likelihood, we can test certain hypothesis about NR by comparing the 
likelihoods associated with unrestricted and restricted models.  Restrictions are imposed by 
relating V
N to V
I such that NR equals a particular value.  For example, suppose we want to test a 
NR of 0.5.  In this case, we restrict V
N to be equal to V
I.  In general, if the null hypothesis is NR 
= φ, V
N = (φ / (1- φ)) V
I = Φ V
I.   33
  To test the validity of these restrictions, we use a likelihood ratio test.  The maximum 





UN I {V ,V ,k, } Ψ= λ ,                         (A15a) 
  
~~~ ~
RN I I { V V, V, k , } Ψ= = Φ λ ,                        (A15b) 
 
where the ^ and 
~ superscripts indicate estimated values for the unrestricted and restricted 
models, respectively.  If the restriction is valid, the values of the unrestricted and restricted log 
likelihood functions should not be too far apart as assessed by the likelihood ratio test statistic, 
LR(Φ),  
 
   RU L R () 2 { l n L ( () ) l n L ( ) } Φ= − Ψ Φ − Ψ ,         ( A 1 6 )    
 
where  2
r LR( ) ~ Φχ  and r is the number of restrictions (one in this case).   The p-values 
associated with equation (A16) for the null hypothesis that NR = φ  = 0.1 (Φ = (1/9)) are 
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Table 1:  List Of U.S. Country Closed-End Funds 
Country               Country Closed-End Fund (CCEF)                       Ticker               CUSIP              Start                  End       TH       TS        INST 
     (1)                                              (2)                                                       (3)                        (4)                   (5)                     (6)         (7)      (8)          (9) 
Argentina  Argentina Fund   AF  4011210  12/31/1991 12/14/2001 87 2480 0.237
Australia  First Australia Fund   IAF  301110  12/26/1985 12/31/2004 63 4742 0.068
Australia  Kleinwort Benson Australian Fund  KBA  26157B10  12/26/1986 11/19/1999 41 3244 0.072
Austria Austria  Fund    OST 5258710  10/26/1989 4/26/2002 194 2982 0.099
Brazil  Brazil Fund   BZF  10575910  4/15/1988 12/30/2004 213 4013 0.287
Brazil  Brazilian Equity Fund   BZL  10588410  4/15/1992 12/30/2004 143 3069 0.250
Chile  Chile Fund   CH  16883410  10/12/1989 12/30/2004 131 3719 0.288
China China  Fund  CHN  16937310  10/1/1992 12/31/2004 186 2959 0.141
China  Greater China Fund   GCH  39167B10  10/1/1992 12/31/2004 186 2956 0.197
China  Jardine Fleming China Region Fund  JFC  46614T10  10/1/1992 12/31/2004 186 2955 0.091
China  Templeton China World Fund   TCH  88018X10  10/1/1992 8/8/2003 160 2338 0.159
Czech  Czech Republic Fund   CRF  21923Y10  10/28/1994 2/20/1998 54 806  0.085
France France  Fund    FRN  35177610  7/14/1986 12/8/1989 29 864  0.083
France  France Growth Fund   FRF  35177K10  5/24/1990 6/18/2004 97 3459 0.212
Germany  Germany Fund   GER  37414310  11/19/1986 12/30/2004 117 4540 0.057
Germany  New Germany Fund   GF  64446510  4/16/1990 12/30/2004 91 3675 0.157
Germany  Emerging Germany Fund   FRG  26156W10  4/16/1990 2/11/1999 65 2177 N.A.
India  India Fund   IFN  45408910  3/10/1994 12/31/2004 169 2570 0.282
India  India Growth Fund   IGF  45409010  8/15/1988 5/22/2003 226 3187 0.229
India  Morgan Stanley India Investment Fund   IIF  61745C10  3/10/1994 12/31/2004 169 2567 0.274
India  Jardine Fleming India Fund   JFI  78657R10  3/10/1994 6/27/2003 155 2192 0.378
Indonesia  Indonesia Fund   IF  45577810  3/27/1990 11/12/2001 142 2811 0.132
Indonesia  Jakarta Growth Fund  JGF  47012010  4/26/1990 4/11/2000 123 2405 0.088
Ireland  Irish Investment Fund  IRL  64567310  4/16/1990 12/31/2004 108 3613 0.193
Israel  First Israel Fund  ISL  32063L10  3/5/1993 12/30/2004 229 2843 0.196  35
Italy  Italy Fund   ITA  46539510  4/25/1986 2/13/2003 95 4187 0.189
Japan Japan  Equity  Fund  JEQ  47105710  9/15/1992 12/30/2004 167 2953 0.083
Japan Japan  Fund  JPN  47107010  1/14/1980 8/13/1987 97 1828 0.065
Japan  Japan OTC Equity Fund  JOF  47109U10  3/20/1990 12/30/2004 200 3533 0.128
Korea  Fidelity Advisor Korea Fund  FAK  31580410  12/29/1994 6/30/2000 68 1367 0.108
Korea Korea  Fund  KF  50063410  10/7/1987 12/30/2004 223 4914 0.253
Korea  Korean Investment Fund  KIF  50063710  3/10/1992 11/26/2001 119 2347 0.200
Korea  Korea Equity Fund  KEF  50063B10  12/29/1993 12/30/2004 142 2654 0.251
Malaysia  Malaysia Fund   MF  56090510  5/12/1987 12/31/2004 196 4257 0.086
Mexico  Emerging Mexico Fund  MEF  29089110  10/12/1990 4/6/1999 73 2076 0.111
Mexico  Mexico Equity & Income Fund  MXE  59283410  10/12/1990 12/31/2004 107 3519 0.201
Mexico  MEXICO FUND INC  MXF  59283510  2/5/1990 12/31/2004 111 5834 0.198
Pakistan  Pakistan Investment Fund  PKF  69584410  1/10/1994 6/22/2001 160 1736 0.229
Philippines  First Philippine Fund  FPF  33610010  4/9/1990 6/18/2003 104 3327 0.131
Portugal Portugal  Fund  PGF 74337620  12/1/1989 12/22/2000 129 2687 N.A.
Russia  Templeton Russia Fund  TRF  88022F10  11/6/1995 12/31/2004 126 2216 0.081
Singapore  Singapore Fund   SGF  82929L10  8/9/1990 12/31/2004 98 3543 0.128
South Africa  Southern Africa Fund   SOA  84215710  8/9/1990 11/18/2004 79 2285 0.322
South Africa  New South Africa Fund   NSA  64880R10  8/9/1990 6/1/1999 30 958  0.198
South Africa  ASA LTD  ASA  G3156P10  8/9/1990 12/31/2004 81 2312 0.216
Spain  Growth Fund of Spain   GSP  39987710  3/19/1990 12/7/1998 111 2116 0.137
Spain  Spain Fund   SNF  84633010  6/29/1988 12/30/2004 183 3987 0.115
Switzerland  Swiss Helvetia Fund   SWZ  87087510  12/24/1987 12/30/2004 113 4269 0.188
Taiwan  Taiwan Equity Fund   TYW  87403110  7/29/1994 5/5/2000 103 1362 0.202
Taiwan Taiwan  Fund    TWN  87403610  9/28/1987 12/31/2004 274 4276 0.220
Thailand  Thai Fund   TTF  88290410  3/2/1988 12/30/2004 230 4027 0.055
Thailand  Thai Capital Fund   TC  88290520  7/9/1990 2/6/2001 149 2556 0.068
Turkey  Turkish Investment Fund   TKF  90014510  4/3/1992 12/29/2004 146 3655 0.169
UK  United Kingdom Fund   UKM  91076610  8/31/1987 4/26/1999 46 2914 0.085  36
Notes to Table 1   
Data are drawn from the CRSP database on WRDS beginning 1/1/80 (or that the date the CCEF was first listed) and ending 12/31/04 (or 
the date that the CCEF was delisted).  Closed-end funds are identified by the second digit in SHARE CODE and, from this set, CCEF's 
are identified by the fund name.  CCEF's that cover more than one country (with one exception noted below) are excluded. Several 
changes occurred during the sample period:  First Australia became Aberdeen Australia after 5/1/2001; Czech Fund renamed Central 
European Value Fund after 2/20/1998; and Jardine Fleming India became the Saffron Fund after 6/27/2003 and coverage expands to 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, which constitute 10% of total fund assets.  Thai Capital Fund has price = 0 from 2/7/2001 - 
12/26/2003.  TH and TS are the number of holidays and standard days, respectively.  INST is the percentage of outstanding equity owned 
by institutions; see the notes to Table 5 for details.  N.A. indicates data are not available.  
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Table 2:  Estimates Of Noise, Information, And The Noise Ratio 
                Returns Distributed Normal And Trading Volume 
                U.S. CCEF's 
 
 Returns    Volume
Country Closed-End Fund (CCEF)  NR  VN SE(VN) VI  SE(VI)  p-value    NRVOL 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7)    (8) 
              
Argentina Fund  0.515 2.392 0.363 2.251 0.386  0.000    0.468
First Australia  0.744 2.630 0.469 0.905 0.474  0.000    0.528
Kleinwort Benson Australian Fund  0.870 1.514 0.334 0.226 0.337 0.000    0.566
Austria Fund  0.103 3.356 0.341 29.085 0.907 0.000    0.412
Brazil Fund  0.953 5.885 0.570 0.290 0.587  0.000    0.487
Brazilan Equity Fund  0.602 4.624 0.547 3.060 0.581 0.000    0.500
Chile Fund  0.662 3.088 0.382 1.575 0.397  0.000    0.434
China Fund  0.898 3.856 0.400 0.438 0.415  0.000    0.525
Greater China Fund  0.775 3.815 0.396 1.107 0.416 0.000    0.519
Jardine Fleming China Region  0.930 3.955 0.410 0.297 0.425  0.000    0.516
Templeton China World Fund  0.672 2.431 0.272 1.186 0.292  0.000    0.451
Czech Republic Fund  1.000 3.442 0.663 0.000 0.684 0.000    0.443
France Fund  0.322 2.022 0.531 4.265 0.611  0.000    0.407
France Growth Fund  0.751 1.982 0.285 0.656 0.292  0.000    0.430
Germany Fund  0.828 3.746 0.490 0.779 0.499 0.000    0.511
New Germany Fund  0.897 2.659 0.394 0.305 0.400  0.000    0.442
Emerging Germany Fund  1.000 3.526 0.619 0.000 0.628 0.000    0.498
India Fund  0.583 2.807 0.305 2.004 0.334 0.000    0.495
India Growth Fund  0.827 3.947 0.240 0.828 0.268 0.000    0.459
Morgan Stanley India  0.640 3.180 0.346 1.786 0.373 0.000    0.510
Jardine Fleming India  0.543 2.625 0.298 2.210 0.332 0.000    0.475
Indonesia Fund  0.906 10.065 1.195 1.044 1.231 0.000    0.497
Jakarta Growth Fund  0.719 6.496 0.828 2.533 0.868 0.000    0.501
Irish Investment Fund  1.000 4.477 0.609 0.000 0.618 0.000    0.522
First Israel Fund  0.685 2.028 0.190 0.933 0.205 0.000    0.411
Italy Fund  0.525 2.525 0.366 2.282 0.381  0.000    0.426
Japan Equity Fund  0.888 3.640 0.398 0.461 0.412 0.000    0.498
Japan Fund  1.000 4.097 0.588 0.000 0.604  0.000    0.481
Japan OTC Equity Fund  0.724 4.372 0.437 1.668 0.460 0.000    0.489
Fidelity Korea Fund  0.798 5.376 0.922 1.363 0.957  0.000    0.540
Korea Fund  0.772 6.509 0.616 1.921 0.639  0.000    0.518
Korean Investment Fund  0.705 4.759 0.617 1.995 0.648 0.000    0.508
Korea Equity Fund  0.994 5.880 0.698 0.033 0.716 0.000    0.537
Malaysia Fund  0.930 6.762 0.683 0.506 0.701  0.000    0.478
Emerging Mexico Fund  0.615 3.999 0.662 2.498 0.692  0.000    0.455
Mexico Equity and Income  0.576 2.609 0.357 1.923 0.373 0.000    0.440
Mexico Fund  0.311 2.485 0.334 5.498 0.365  0.000    0.509
Pakistan Investment Fund  0.758 6.175 0.690 1.969 0.744 0.000    0.502
First Philippine Fund  1.000 6.557 0.909 0.000 0.923  0.000    0.468
Portugal Fund  0.705 2.535 0.316 1.063 0.331  0.000    0.496
Templeton Russia Fund  0.938 9.173 1.156 0.602 1.192  0.000    0.460
Singapore Fund  0.522 1.981 0.283 1.817 0.297  0.000    0.488  38
Southern Africa Fund  0.990 2.547 0.405 0.025 0.412 0.000    0.478
New South Africa Fund  0.400 1.052 0.272 1.576 0.297 0.000    0.387
ASA Ltd  1.000 6.133 0.964 0.000 0.980  0.000    0.500
Growth Fund of Spain  0.890 2.409 0.323 0.298 0.334 0.000    0.459
Spain Fund  1.000 5.000 0.523 0.000 0.535 0.000    0.462
Swiss Helvetia Fund  0.581 1.904 0.253 1.372 0.263 0.000    0.504
Taiwan Equity Fund  0.944 3.278 0.457 0.195 0.476 0.000    0.423
Taiwan Fund  1.000 9.999 0.854 0.000 0.881  0.000    0.515
Thai Fund  0.786 5.978 0.557 1.628 0.583  0.000    0.480
Thai Capital Fund  1.000 8.820 1.022 0.000 1.051  0.000    0.486
Turkish Investment Fund  0.651 6.206 0.726 3.329 0.760 0.000    0.489
United Kingdom Fund  1.000 4.445 0.927 0.000 0.934 0.000    0.489
              
Mean  0.767          0.481
Median  0.781          0.489
 
 
Notes to Table 2 
See Notes to Table 1 for details about the data.  The noise ratio for returns (NR) in column (2) is 
computed according to equation (4) for U.S. CCEF’s.  Returns are assumed to be distributed 
normal and are adjusted for exchange rates and the U.S. market return as discussed in Section II.  
V
N and V
I are maximum likelihood estimates, which are equivalent to method of moments 
estimates under the assumptions used to construct the estimates in this table.  Standard errors 
(SE) are computed as follows:  SE[V




 2 + 
(2/TS)*VS
 2}
(1/2).  The values of V
N, V
I, and the SE’s reported in Table 2 are multiplied by 10
4.  
Column (7) contains the p-value for evaluating the null hypothesis that NR = 0.10.  The noise ratio for 
volume (NR
VOL) in column (8) is computed according to equation (5) for U.S. CCEF's.   
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Table 3:  Estimates Of Noise, Information, And The Noise Ratio 
                Returns Distributed Scaled-t 
                U.S. CCEF's 
 
Country Closed-End Fund (CCEF)  NR  V
N  V
I  k p-value 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Argentina  Fund  0.682 3.181 1.486  4  0.000 
First  Australia  0.977 3.025 0.071  4  0.000 
Kleinwort Benson Australian Fund  0.938  1.560  0.104  6  0.000 
Austria  Fund  0.767 4.263 1.298  3  0.000 
Brazil  Fund  0.897 5.355 0.618  4  0.000 
Brazilian Equity Fund  0.746  5.410  1.844  4  0.000 
Chile  Fund  0.672 2.871 1.399  3  0.000 
China  Fund  0.871 4.049 0.601  4  0.000 
Greater China Fund  0.920  4.540  0.394  4  0.000 
Jardine Fleming China Region  0.959  3.995  0.170  5  0.000 
Templeton China World Fund  0.784  2.893  0.796  5  0.000 
Czech Republic Fund  1.000  2.926  0.000  4  0.000 
France  Fund  0.838 3.255 0.629  4  0.000 
France Growth Fund  0.795  2.042  0.528  5  0.000 
Germany  Fund  0.819 4.084 0.905  3  0.000 
New Germany Fund  1.000  2.845  0.000  4  0.000 
Emerging Germany Fund  1.000  3.279  0.000  5  0.000 
India  Fund  0.639 3.060 1.732  6  0.000 
India  Growth  Fund  0.881 4.934 0.669  3  0.000 
Morgan Stanley India  0.763  3.848  1.192  5  0.000 
Jardine Fleming India  0.544  2.652  2.224  5  0.000 
Indonesia Fund  1.000  11.978  0.000  3  0.000 
Jakarta  Growth  Fund  0.931 9.809 0.722  3  0.000 
Irish Investment Fund  1.000  2.373  0.000  4  0.000 
First Israel Fund  0.760  2.252  0.711  4  0.000 
Italy  Fund  0.830 4.216 0.865  3  0.000 
Japan Equity Fund  0.960  3.895  0.164  5  0.000 
Japan  Fund  1.000 3.073 0.000  4  0.000 
Japan OTC Equity Fund  0.822  5.027  1.087  5  0.000 
Fidelity Korea Fund  0.716  5.107  2.021  4  0.000 
Korea  Fund  0.836 5.142 1.012  4  0.000 
Korean Investment Fund  0.762  5.187  1.621  4  0.000 
Korea Equity Fund  1.000  6.056  0.000  6  0.000 
Malaysia  Fund  0.928 7.506 0.581  3  0.000 
Emerging Mexico Fund  0.713  4.519  1.819  4  0.000 
Mexico Equity and Income  0.759  3.991  1.269  3  0.000 
Mexico  Fund  0.417 3.653 5.109  3  0.000 
Pakistan Investment Fund  0.714  6.113  2.443  4  0.000 
First Philippine Fund  0.981  5.442  0.106  4  0.000 
Portugal  Fund  0.947 3.828 0.216  3  0.000 
Templeton Russia Fund  0.744  9.081  3.128  3  0.000 
Singapore  Fund  0.623 2.515 1.519  4  0.000 
Southern Africa Fund  0.715 2.063 0.823  3  0.000   40
New South Africa Fund  0.574  1.630  1.209  3  0.000 
ASA  Ltd  1.000 6.440 0.000  3  0.000 
Growth Fund of Spain  0.858  2.288  0.379  5  0.000 
Spain  Fund  1.000 5.451 0.000  3  0.000 
Swiss Helvetia Fund  0.951  2.532  0.131  3  0.000 
Taiwan Equity Fund  0.785  2.787  0.764  5  0.000 
Taiwan  Fund  0.836 6.100 1.200  3  0.000 
Thai  Fund  0.862 8.548 1.369  3  0.000 
Thai Capital Fund  0.968  9.261  0.302  3  0.000 
Turkish Investment Fund  0.751  6.889  2.288  5  0.000 
United Kingdom Fund  1.000  2.445  0.000  5  0.000 
       
Mean    0.838      
Median  0.837      
 
 
Notes to Table 3 
See Notes to Table 1 for details about the data.  The noise ratio for returns (NR) in column (2) is 
computed according to equation (4) for U.S. CCEF’s.  Returns are assumed to be distributed 
Scaled-t as described in fn. 8.  The parameters {V
N, V
I, k} are estimated by maximum likelihood 
based on a grid search: the parameter space is determined by the admissible values in equation 
(3):  V
N = {(1/m)VH, (2/m)VH,…, VH}, V
I = {(1/m)VS, (2/m)VS,…, VS}, k = {3, 4,…, 30}, 
where the parameter determining the size of the increments is m = 400.  When k equals 30, the 
Scaled-t distribution approximates a normal distribution.  The values of V
N and V
I reported in 
Table 3 are multiplied by 10
4.  Column (6) contains the p-value for evaluating the null hypothesis that 
NR = 0.10.   
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Table 4:  Estimates Of Noise, Information, And The Noise Ratio 
                Returns Distributed Scaled-t 
                Information Affects Holiday Returns (λ > 0) 
                U.S. CCEF's 
 
 
Country Closed-End Fund (CCEF)            NR             V
N               V
I                    k                λ       p-value 
                     (1)                                             (2)             (3)              (4)                 (5)             (6)            (7) 
 
Argentina Fund  0.682 3.181 1.486 4  0  0.000
First Australia  0.977 3.025 0.071 4  0.5  0.000
Kleinwort Benson Australian Fund  0.009 0.015 1.671 6  0.5  0.000
Austria Fund  0.535 2.987 2.595 3  0.5  0.000
Brazil Fund  0.713 4.296 1.729 4  0.5  0.000
Brazilian Equity Fund  0.746 5.410 1.844 4  0  0.000
Chile Fund  0.672 2.871 1.399 3  0  0.000
China Fund  0.759 3.509 1.117 4  0.5  0.000
Greater China Fund  0.920 4.540 0.394 4  0  0.000
Jardine Fleming China Region  0.919 3.837 0.340 5  0.5  0.000
Templeton China World Fund  0.784 2.893 0.796 5  0  0.000
Czech Republic Fund  1.000 2.926 0.000 4  0  0.000
France Fund  0.838 3.255 0.629 4  0  0.000
France Growth Fund  0.752 1.923 0.633 5  0.1  0.000
Germany Fund  0.621 3.110 1.901 3  0.5  0.000
New Germany Fund  1.000 2.845 0.000 4  0.1  0.000
Emerging Germany Fund  1.000 3.279 0.000 5  0.3  0.000
India Fund  0.639 3.060 1.732 6  0  0.000
India Growth Fund  0.779 4.382 1.242 3  0.5  0.000
Morgan Stanley India  0.763 3.848 1.192 5  0  0.000
Jardine Fleming India  0.404 1.969 2.901 5  0.3  0.000
Indonesia Fund  1.000 11.978 0.000 3  0.4  0.000
Jakarta Growth Fund  0.931 9.809 0.722 3  0  0.000
Irish Investment Fund  1.000 2.373 0.000 4  0.5  0.000
First Israel Fund  0.760 2.252 0.711 4  0  0.000
Italy Fund  0.830 4.216 0.865 3  0  0.000
Japan Equity Fund  0.960 3.895 0.164 5  0.1  0.000
Japan Fund  1.000 3.073 0.000 4  0.1  0.000
Japan OTC Equity Fund  0.822 5.027 1.087 5  0  0.000
Fidelity Korea Fund  0.232 1.666 5.525 4  0.5  0.200
Korea Fund  0.644 3.970 2.192 4  0.5  0.000
Korean Investment Fund  0.762 5.187 1.621 4  0  0.000
Korea Equity Fund  1.000 6.056 0.000 6  0.3  0.000
Malaysia Fund  0.906 5.613 0.581 3  0  0.000
Emerging Mexico Fund  0.721 6.038 2.339 4  0  0.000
Mexico Equity and Income  0.759 3.991 1.269 3  0  0.000
Mexico Fund  0.399 2.758 4.151 3  0  0.008
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Pakistan Investment Fund  0.411 3.520 5.049 4  0.5  0.048
First Philippine Fund  0.957 7.016 0.317 4  0.3  0.000
Portugal Fund  0.947 3.828 0.216 3  0.2  0.000
Templeton Russia Fund  0.439 4.128 5.278 3  0.5  0.000
Singapore Fund  0.629 3.347 1.975 4  0  0.009
Southern Africa Fund  0.484 1.401 1.492 3 0.5  0.002
New South Africa Fund  0.574 1.630 1.209 3  0  0.024
ASA Ltd  1.000 4.600 0.000 3  0.4  0.000
Growth Fund of Spain  0.577 2.288 1.678 5  0.5  0.002
Spain Fund  1.000 4.150 0.000 3  0.5  0.000
Swiss Helvetia Fund  0.964 1.770 0.066 3 0.1  0.000
Taiwan Equity Fund  0.527 2.787 2.501 5  0.5  0.000
Taiwan Fund  0.671 4.900 2.400 3  0.5  0.000
Thai Fund  0.830 8.189 1.673 3  0.2  0.000
Thai Capital Fund  0.978 6.615 0.151 3  0.5  0.000
Turkish Investment Fund  0.755 7.633 2.479 5  0  0.000
United Kingdom Fund  1.000 2.712 0.000 5  0.5  0.000
        
Mean  0.759     
Median  0.763     
        




Notes to Table 4 
See Notes to Table 1 for details about the data.  The noise ratio for returns (NR) in column (2) is 
computed according to equation (4) for U.S. CCEF’s.  Returns are assumed to be distributed Scaled-
t as described in fn. 8, and information affects VH per equation (7).  The parameters {V
N, V
I, k, λ} are 
estimated by maximum likelihood based on a grid search: the parameter space is determined by the 
admissible values in equation (3):  V
N = {(1/m)VH, (2/m)VH,…, VH}, V
I = {(1/m)VS, (2/m)VS,…, VS}, k 
= {3, 4,…, 30} λ = {0.1, 0.1,…,0.5}, where the parameter determining the size of the increments is m = 
400.  When k equals 30, the Scaled-t distribution approximates a normal distribution.  The values of V
N 
and V
I reported in Table 4 are multiplied by 10
4.  Column (7) contains the p-value for evaluating the 
null hypothesis that NR = 0.10.   
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Table 5:  OLS Estimates Of The Elasticity Of Noise With  
                Respect To Institutional Ownership  
                U.S. CCEF's 
 
 
Noise Ratio                  Elasticity        α                              β                    Adj. R
2 
       (1)                               (2)                          (3)                           (4)                       (5) 
 
A.  Complete Sample 
Normal -0.097    0.838  -0.443  0.007 
λ = 0  (0.082)  (0.069)  (0.378)   
        
Scaled-t -0.162**    0.967  -0.808  0.193 
λ = 0  (0.044)  (0.041)  (0.222)   
        
Scaled-t -0.144*    0.859  -0.648  0.033 
λ ≠ 0  (0.087)  (0.072)  (0.392)   
        
        
B.  Trimmed Sample        
Normal -0.107    0.842  -0.501  0.005 
λ = 0  (0.095)  (0.079)  (0.447)   
        
Scaled-t -0.141**    0.960  -0.729  0.126 
λ = 0  (0.051)  (0.046)  (0.262)   
        
Scaled-t -0.161**    0.917  -0.784  0.079 
λ ≠ 0  (0.072)  (0.062)  (0.350)   
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Notes to Table 5 
Estimates based on  cc c NR *INST e =α+β + , where c indexes the CCEF's.  The elasticity in 
column (2) equals β * MEAN[INSTc] / MEAN[NRc].   ** and * indicate statistical significance 
of the estimated elasticities at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  The NRc's in the first, 
second, and third rows of panels A and B are taken from column 2 of Tables 2, 3, and 4, 
respectively.  INSTc is the percentage of outstanding equity owned by institutions (a bank, 
insurance company, investment companies (mutual funds) and their managers, independent 
investment advisor (brokerage companies), or a college/university endowment).  Only 
institutions that manage over $100 million are required to file, and filers may omit small 
holdings under 10,000 shares or $200,000.  The data are drawn from the CDA/Spectrum 
database on WRDS.  INSTc equals the average institutional ownership stated as a percentage of 
outstanding shares.  It is computed as the mean of INSTc,t, where INSTc,t  is institutional 
ownership for CCEF c at time t and is defined as the sum over all institutions (i) of shares held 
by institutions at the end of the year (SHARESi,c,t) divided by the number of shares outstanding 
in millions at the end of the year (SHROUT1c,t  * 1,000,000).  The results in panel A are based 
on a sample of 52 out of the 54 CCEF's listed in Table 1; INSTc data are not available for the 
Emerging Germany Fund and the Portugal Fund.  The results in Panel B are based on a sample 
of 48 CCEF's that has been trimmed to reduce the possible effect of outliers -- two CCEF's xx 
(Kleinwort Benson Australian Fund and Fidelity Korea Fund) with relatively low NRc's (from 
Table 4) and two CCEF's (Jardine Fleming India Fund and Southern Africa Fund) with relatively 
high INSTc's.    
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Table 6:  Estimates Of Noise, Information, And The Noise Ratio 
                Returns Distributed Normal, Scaled-t, Scaled-t  
             With Information Affecting Holiday Returns (λ > 0)  
                U.K. CCEF's 
 
Country Closed-End Fund (CCEF)                                             Normal               Scaled-t          Scaled-t 
                                                                                                          λ=0                      λ=0                   λ ≠0 
                     (1)                                                                                  (2)                       (3)                      (4)  
 
Canadian General Investments Ltd  0.202 0.027 0.018
JPMF Chinese  0.393 0.852 0.852
German Smaller Companies  0.532 1.000 0.048
JPMF Indian   0.497 0.673 0.312
New India IT  0.555 1.000 1.000
Edinburgh Java  0.670 0.938 0.056
Gartmore Irish Growth Fund  0.400 0.953 0.858
Baillie Gifford Japan  0.283 0.411 0.109
Baillie Gifford Shin Nippon  0.357 0.585 0.194
Edinburgh Japan  0.301 0.494 0.494
Fidelity Japanese Value  0.305 0.448 0.144
Gartmore Select Japanese  0.260 0.437 0.161
GT Japan  0.386 0.695 0.695
Henderson Japan  0.386 0.721 0.721
Invesco Japan Discovery  0.387 0.634 0.337
Invesco Tokyo  0.371 0.559 0.278
JPMF Japanese  0.102 0.730 0.640
JPMF Japanese Smaller Companies  0.338 0.679 0.168
Martin Currie Japan  0.337 0.430 0.277
Perpetual Japan  0.331 0.476 0.145
Schroder Japanese Growth  0.353 0.529 0.491
Korea-Europe Fund  0.614 0.382 0.054
Schroder Korea  0.609 0.732 0.100
JF Philippine  0.150 1.000 1.000
JPMF Russian  0.786 0.431 0.060
Old Mutual S. Africa  0.403 0.973 0.973
Aberdeen New Thai  0.391 0.799 0.189
Edinburgh US Tracker  0.521 0.455 0.010
Foreign & Colonial US Smaller   0.785 0.732 0.385
JPMF American  0.116 0.506 0.011
JPMF US Discovery  0.620 0.543 0.029
US Smaller Companies  0.386 0.791 0.791
      
Mean 0.410 0.644 0.363
Median 0.386 0.654 0.236
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Notes to Table 6 
See Notes to Table 1 for details about the data.  The table entries in columns (2), (3), and (4) are 
comparable to those in column (2) of Tables 2, 3, and 4, respectively, except that the entries in 
Table 6 are computed for U.K. CCEF’s.  In column (2), returns are assumed to be distributed 
normal, and there is no leakage of information during holidays.  In column (3), returns are 
assumed to be distributed Scaled-t, and there is no leakage of information during holidays.  In 
column (4), returns are assumed to be distributed Scaled-t, and there is the possibility of leakage 
of information during holidays.  All parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood based on a 
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Table 7:  Noise Ratio Means And The Ratio Of The Noise Ratios 
         U.S. And U.K. CCEF’s For The Same Country 
 
Country Normal,  λ=0 Scaled-t,  λ=0 Scaled-t,  λ≠0 
 U.S.  U.K.  U.S.  U.K. U.S. U.K. 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 
 
      
China  
  0.819 0.393 0.884 0.852 0.846 0.852 
  RNR = 0.480  RNR = 0.964  RNR = 1.007 
      
            
Germany 0.908  0.532  0.940  1.000  0.874  0.048 
  RNR = 0.586  RNR = 1.064  RNR = 0.055 
      
            
India    0.648  0.526  0.707  0.837  0.646  0.656 
  RNR = 0.812  RNR = 1.184  RNR = 1.015 
      
            
Indonesia 0.813  0.670  0.966  0.938  0.966  0.056 
  RNR = 0.824  RNR = 0.971   RNR = 0.058 
      
Ireland    1.000  0.400  1.000  0.953  1.000  0.858 
  RNR = 0.400  RNR = 0.953  RNR = 0.858 
      
Japan 0.871  0.321  0.927  0.559  0.927  0.347 
  RNR = 0.369  RNR = 0.603  RNR = 0.374 
      
Korea 0.817  0.612  0.829  0.557  0.660  0.527 
  RNR = 0.749  RNR = 0.672  RNR = 0.798 
      
Philippines 1.000 0.150 0.981 1.000 0.957 1.000 
  RNR = 0.150  RNR = 1.019  RNR = 1.045 
      
Russia 0.938  0.786  0.744  0.431  0.439  0.060 
  RNR = 0.838  RNR = 0.579  RNR = 0.137 
      
South Africa    0.797  0.403 0.763 0.973 0.686 0.973 
  RNR = 0.506  RNR = 1.275  RNR = 1.418 
      
Thailand 0.893  0.391  0.915  0.799  0.904  0.189 
  RNR = 0.438  RNR = 0.873  RNR = 0.209 
 
 
Notes to Table 7 
The table entries (apart from the RNR’s) are means of noise ratios (NR) for CCEF’s by the 
country in which the assets are invested.  The figures in columns (2), (4), and (6) are taken from 
column (2) of Tables 2, 3, and 4, respectively; the figures in columns (3), (5), and (7) from 
columns (2), (3), and (4), respectively, of Table 6.  RNR equals the ratio of the U.K. entry to the 
U.S. entry for a given country.       